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Abstract: 
This paper argues against the findings of Krueger and Maleckova (2002) and that of Berrebi 
(2003). I provide evidence that Palestinian economic conditions are related to the level of attacks 
against Israelis from 1990-2002. The results of the negative binomial regression suggest that the 
number of shooting attacks against Israelis will rise with the number of Palestinians killed. 
However, I don’t find suicide attacks to be correlated with the number of Palestinians killed. The 
empirical results indicate that the economic determinants of political violence in the WBGS are 
significant and their statistical sign conform to the predictions of deprivation theory. Precisely, 
an increase in the Palestinian income per capita will reduce Palestinian attacks against Israelis. 
Likewise, the model predicts that a reduction in the unemployment rate would reduce the 
incentive for young Palestinians to participate in political violence.  
 
“The policy of curfews and closures is harming Israel’s security… It destroys the agriculture, it increases 
hatred for Israel, and it strengthen the terror organizations…In our tactical decisions we are operating 
contrary to our strategic interest.” 
Lt. Gen. Moshe Ya’alon, IDF Chief of Staff 
 
I.  Introduction 
 In their papers Krueger & Maleckova (2002, henceforth KM) and Berrebi (2003, 
henceforth B) claim that there is no connection between Palestinian education and economic 
deprivation for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS), on the one hand, and suicide and other 
violent attacks, on the other. But it would be wrong to infer from these findings that economic 
factors are insignificant or that other forms of personal hardship are inconsequential. In fact, data 
from the Palestinian case indicate that relative deprivation (a downward trend in economic well-
being, regardless of the initial starting point) and emotional grievance (from physical injury or 
personal loss regarding family and friends) are strongly associated with increasing use and public 
support for the most desperate and devastating form of contemporary political violence, the 
suicide attack.  
 A major methodological problem with KM and B lies in their neglect of the nature of the 
political struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and the authors’ failure to account for 
the sociopolitical pressures resulting from it. Instead KM and B preferred to focus solely on 
economic variables. In this writer’s view, studies of the determinants of violence, including 
suicide attack, must include both political and economic aspects as will become evident in the 
empirical section of this paper. Nevertheless, Krueger and colleagues have made an important 
contribution to our understanding of contemporary forms of terrorism that stem from the Middle 
East by demonstrating that standard economic models of (blue-collar) crime do not reliably 
account for the patterns of violence in the Middle East.  
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  Therefore, the main thesis of this paper is to argue against the findings of KM and B by 
providing empirical evidence indicating a strong correlation between economic conditions in the 
WBGS and the number of Palestinian attacks during the period from 1990-2002 in which Israel 
initiated its policy of political and economic separation from the WBGS. Also, I will explain 
why economic factors in the WBGS have become, since 1990, a motivating factor in the attacks 
against Israelis. The findings of this paper will suggest that an enhancement in economic 
conditions in the Palestinian Territories and respect for the Palestinian human rights will 
significantly enhance the security of the Israelis. Furthermore, the empirical evidence presented 
here points to the ineffectiveness of the “get-tough policy” in suspending attacks and protecting 
the citizens of the state of Israel. 
 The fact that most of the Palestinian militants and suicide bombers did have a source of 
income from civilian employment shows that Palestinians don’t seek to join the resistance 
movement mainly for the purposes of earning income or other monetary benefits. It is the 
implied assumption in KM and B that the utility function of Palestinian militants depends only 
on quantifiable economic variables and nothing else that is problematic. 
 The problem in their studies can be traced to using the economic theory of crime to 
predict the determinants of political violence, an oversimplification that is tantamount to 
committing a fallacy of composition. In general, economic theory of crime predicts that “a rise in 
the income available in legal activities or an increase in law-abidingness due, say, to ‘education’ 
would reduce the incentive to enter illegal activities” (Becker, 1968, p. 177).  But participation in 
collective political violence is not necessarily identical to participation in criminal activities. 
Unlike criminals and outlaws, individuals joining insurrectionist political groups don’t consider 
their activities illegal. Hence, the determinants of political unrest should not be restricted only to 
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education and poverty—the focus of the economics of crime; rather, a set of other variables that 
measure political tensions, variables ignored by KM and B, should be included: for example, the 
desire for retaliation and revenge or the individual's commitment to nationalist aspirations of 
freedom and independence. Incorporating only economic factors as the sole determinants of 
political violence in the WBGS is erroneous.  
Unlike KM and B, economists always found evidence that violent political conflicts have 
economic roots. For instance, Parvin (1973) demonstrates the importance of economic variables 
as “[the] main explanatory variables of political violence”. His results indicate that income 
inequality, gross national product, and the growth rate of the economy can explain a significant 
percentage of the variations in the level of political unrest in 26 countries. Stein (1990) compared 
the Palestinian uprising of 1988 with the Arab revolt of 1936. He observed that the period prior 
to either of the violent episodes was characterized by growing and intolerable political frustration 
in the Palestinian street. Moreover, fueling this frustration was “economic hardship borne of 
unemployment and underemployment, the drying up of traditional sources of capital import, and 
dramatic price drops, particularly in Agriculture”.  
Nafziger and Auvinen (2000) provide evidence from cross-country studies of the 
significance of economic factors in predicting the emergence of conflicts. The authors show that 
their measures of conflicts are inversely associated with real GDP growth, GNP per capita, food 
output growth, and IMF funding. They indicate that “stagnation and decline in incomes 
exacerbate the feelings of relative deprivation” that can be responsible for social unrest and 
anger. Similarly, other studies confirm the critical role economic conditions play in generating 
collective political unrest (e.g., Khawaja, 1995; Ben Meir, 2001; Berger and Spoerer , 2001 ; 
Davis, 2002). 
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 The paper will proceed in the following manner; in the second section I will explain the 
critical role economic conditions play in WBGS as a source motivating attacks. In the third 
section, I will discuss the method of collecting data on Palestinian attacks. In Section four, I will 
present evidence that Palestinian militant groups specialize in their method of attack. In section 
five, I will introduce the empirical results of the count data regression that show a significant 
correlation between Palestinian attacks, on the one hand, and real GNP per capita and the 
unemployment rate, on the other. Section six is the conclusion. 
 
 II.  Israel’s Policy of Separation and Economic Conditions in the WBGS 
 
 The Oslo Peace Accord (OPA) brought with it the promise for a better future for the 
whole Middle East region.  In particular, the Palestinians and Israelis were optimistic about the 
economic prosperity that will come from the cessation of hostilities. For instance, in an opinion 
survey in June 1994 after the first agreement on IDF redeployment from Gaza and Jericho, more 
than one third of the Palestinians felt that the peace process would improve their economic 
situation. Only 14 percent of the respondents feared that the Oslo peace process would worsen 
their economic condition (CPRS, 1994). Now, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(PCBS) reported that over 50 percent of the Palestinians consider finding a job and money as 
their first priority. 
 For the two economies on either side of the Green line the period from 1990-2000 was a 
period of wide disparity in the achieved rates of economic growth and prosperity. While Israelis, 
in general, enjoyed unprecedented favorable economic conditions, the Palestinians living in the 
WBGS experienced a level of economic hardship unforeseen since before the first intifada of 
1987. Simply, the period after OPA is characterized by a rapidly rising inequality between the 
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Israelis and the Palestinians. For when the Israeli economy was enjoying an economic boom- a 
result of the flourishing high-tech industry and improved investment climate after the signing of 
the peace treaty with Jordan and the Palestinians. Israel’s policy of closures caused the 
Palestinian economy to stagnate throughout the 90s. Actually, Fischer et al. (2001) argued that 
the restrictions on employment of Palestinians in Israel caused a collapse of the Palestinian 
economy.  The attempts by Israel to rapidly separate itself (economically and politically) from 
the WBGS after the OPA prevented any viable economic development and worsened economic 
hardship relative to pre-OPA period.  
 The policy of closure was first instituted in January 1991 as a temporary measure during 
the Gulf War. In March 1993, that policy became permanent. The Israeli government has been 
enforcing three types of closures depending on the security situation: general, total, and internal. 
The general closure restricts the movement of Palestinian labor and goods between the West 
bank and Israel, between Israel and the Gaza Strip, and between the West Bank and Gaza. Total 
closure describes a situation of complete prohibition on any movement of any kind. Finally, 
internal closure imposes movement restrictions between Palestinian villages and towns in the 
WBGS (Roy, 2001). A recent report by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) found that the majority of the staffed checkpoints in the West Bank do not separate 
between the West Bank and Israel, but rather block passages between Palestinian villages and 
cities. OCHA’s figures indicate that there are 65 staffed checkpoints, of which only nine separate 
the West Bank from Israel, while the remaining 56 prevent traffic between West Bank 
communities. In addition there are 607 physical roadblocks that prevent the passage of vehicles - 
457 mounds of dirt, 94 concrete blocks, and 56 trenches (OCHA, 2003). Israel’s policy of 
closure has fragmented the Palestinian society and obstructed the movement of labor, created 
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disincentive to join the labor force, and more importantly Palestinians became dependent on the 
Palestinian National Authority and relief agencies for income. This fragmentation of the WBGS 
via checkpoints disrupted the economic development for the Palestinians. 
 The sector that was most affected by the closure policy was the Palestinian labor sector. 
Historically the Palestinians depended on Israel for absorbing one third of their labor force. 
However, after the implementation of the closure policy in 1991, the number of Palestinians 
working in Israel or Israeli settlements plummeted to unprecedented level. In 1990 there were 
around 200,000 Palestinians working legally in Israel, but by the year 2000, this number was 
reduced to 42,000 workers. 
  With no alternative means for employment in the WBGS, the economic situation 
deteriorated sharply in the Palestinian territories. To cope with the sharp reduction of disposable 
income, Palestinian households surveyed stated that they have reduced their expenditure on basic 
needs (food and clothing, education, etc.), and delayed the payment of bills (PCBS). Moreover, 
the chronic unemployment situation has increased the “discouraged workers” phenomenon in the 
Palestinian economy. Faced with protracted closures, mobility restrictions, and macroeconomic 
depression, an increasing number of Palestinians appears to have given up finding employment 
altogether.  
 Also the closures policy created a unique pattern in the unemployment statistics in the 
WBGS which was prevalent all through the 90s and is worth examining. The unemployment rate 
varies considerably within a given year due to border closure policy and not as a result of 
cyclical or seasonal fluctuations in business conditions. For example, in 1996 the official 
unemployment rate as reported by the PBCS was 23.9 percent. On the other hand, the United 
Nations Special Coordination Office (UNSCO) reported that unemployment ranged from about 
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20% of the labor force to as high as 50% by the end of the year (Table 1). This amounts to 
approximately 30% spread in one year, and leads to instability of disposable income, savings, 
and consumption for many families living in the WBGS. Such large variations in labor market 
conditions could depress the motive to join labor market and/or increase the burden on younger 
members of the families to join the labor force at an early age, thereby creating a child labor 
problem in the WBGS. The following table presents the high/low levels of unemployment rates 
as reported by major sources. 
Table 1: High-Low unemployment rate during selected years 
 1995 1996 2000 2001 
Lowest 11% WB & 
17% GS 
 
20% 9% 26.9% 
Highest 30% WB & 
33% GS 
50% 28% 35.5% 
 Source: World Bank, International Labor organization, Palestinian Ministry of Labor (MOL),PCBS, 
IMF, UNSCO.  
 
Clearly, the pattern of fluctuations in the unemployment conditions in the WBGS, and the 
resulting instability in incomes and consumptions, increased the stress borne by the Palestinians 
and intensified the incentive to join Palestinian resistance groups or the support for them. Most 
importantly, Palestinians consider Israel responsible for their economic plight. After all, the 
policy of closure is not separating Israel from the Palestinians. It is separating the Palestinians 
from each other. 
The evidence above shows that the unemployment rate in the WBGS is a political 
problem rather than an economic one. Israel’s policy of closure and severe movement restrictions 
that is imposed and lifted haphazardly is creating a unique pattern in the unemployment rate that 
does not exist anywhere else in the world. This severe employment variability enhances the 
disincentive to join the labor market and can lead to increased support for resistance groups. 
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Since the Palestinian unemployment and under-unemployment is a result of the political dispute 
then it should be pivotal in motivating attacks against Israel. Therefore, the facts provided in this 
section should cast doubt on the findings of KM and B. In the empirical section of the paper I 
will provide evidence of the strong correlation between unemployment rate and the number of 
Palestinian attacks. 
  
III.  Dataset 
 For this study, I constructed a dataset on the number of daily, monthly, and annual attacks 
against Israelis from 1990-2002 coded by the type of attack (shooting, bombing, suicide) and the 
Palestinian organization claiming responsibility for the attack (Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, DFLP, and al 
Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades or al Fateh). I used two sources for collecting the data. From 1990-1999, 
the data source is the electronic archives of the International Policy Institute for Counter 
Terrorism (ICT) (www.ict.org.il). The archives list news reports of attacks by Palestinians 
against Israeli targets dating back to1970. All of the reported attacks appear as summaries of 
news reports that were reported in Israeli newspapers and media or international news 
organizations such as the Associated Press and Reuters among others. For the attack data during 
the years 2000-2002, I culled the relevant data to my work by searching the electronic news 
archives of the Jerusalem Post Internet edition (http://www.jpost.com).  
 I identified four major patterns of attacks: (1) shooting attacks are all incidents that 
involved firing a gun or tossing a hand grenade on an Israeli target, (2) suicide attacks which 
involve a Palestinian detonating an explosive device strapped around his(her) body or detonating 
a bag filled with explosives in a closed location (bus, restaurant, mall, or hotel) or among 
pedestrians, (3) Bombing attacks which include any attack where explosives were planted on a 
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car or a boat then crashed into an Israeli target. Other methods of attacks were also identified 
(e.g., lynching, knife attack, pipe bomb, mortar fire, attacks by a vehicle and kidnapping). 
In general five Palestinian resistance groups are involved in the attacks: al-Fateh, Hamas, 
PIJ, PFLP, and DFLP. The category of “other groups “ designates attacks that went unclaimed by 
any political group, or claimed by two groups at the same time, or at very rare occasions, 
included attacks by Hezbollah members and the Forces of Omar Al-Mukhtar, a group associated 
with the Palestine Liberation Front (PFL).  Figure 1 presents the total number of Palestinian 
attacks from 1993-2002. 
Figure 1 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
Total number of Palestinian attacks against Israel
from  Jan. 1993-Dec. 2002
 
The unemployment figures were obtained from The Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics (PBCS) and UNSCO quarterly reports. Finally, the annual and quarterly number of 
Palestinians killed was obtained from B’TSELEM [1] and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society 
(PRCS) websites (all data can be obtained from the author by request).  
 
IV.  Do Militant Groups Specialize in a Specific Method of Attack? 
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 Tables 2 and 3 summarize the data on Palestinian attacks. We can use the two tabulated data 
to investigate whether Palestinian militant groups specialize in one method of attack and not the 
other. For example, do the religious militant groups use suicide attacks more frequently than 
secular groups?   
  Table 2: Total attacks by group and method From 1990-2002 
Group 
 
Shooting         Suicide         Bombing        Other  Totals 
 
Fateh 
Hamas 
PIJ  
DFLP 
PFLP 
Other 
18(80%)       21(14%)          4(3%)          5(3%) 
47(38%)       46(37%)        14(11%)     18(14%) 
12(23%)       25(48%)        11(21%)       4(8%) 
 3                     0                    0                  0 
10(62.5%)     1(6%)          3(19%)    2(12.5%) 
50(41%)        8(6.5%)       13(10.5)   52(42%) 
148 
125 
52 
  3 
16 
123 
Totals   240             101                45           81 467 
 
Without any loss of generality the analysis will proceed by focusing on the three militarily active 
organizations (Hammas, PIJ, Fateh). Table 3 is a 3-by-3 contingency table with data only 
pertaining to al-Fateh, Hamas and PIJ. Accordingly, is there any statistical evidence that the two 
classifications (militant groups versus attack method) are dependent? That is, do militant groups 
randomly select their method of attack or certain attacks are selected by certain groups? 
 
 Table 3: 3-by-3 Contingency Table with Observed and Estimated Expected 
Counts (in Parentheses) 
 
Attack 
Organization Shooting   Suicide Bomber  Bombing       Totals  
Fateh 
 
Hamas 
 
118(84.93)     21(44.14)      4(13.91)        
 
47(63.55)      46(33.03)      14(10.41)      
 
P1 
 
P2 
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PIJ   12(28.51)      25(14.81)      11(4.67) P3 
Totals   Ph                Ps                Pb                  1 
   
 
We can use the  
        X2= 
∑∑
= =
∧
∧−3
1
3
1
2
     )(  
)]([
i j
ij
ijij
nE
nEn
   
 
to compare the observed and expected counts in each cell in the contingency table (McClave & 
Benson 1988). Under the null hypothesis of independence, the sampling distribution of the X2 is 
approximately a  probability distribution with (r-1)(c-1) degrees of freedom, where r is the 
number of rows and c is the number of columns in the table. Substituting the data of Table 3 into 
the expression for the X
2χ
2 test yields X2= 67.86 with four degrees of freedom. This large value of 
X2 implies that the observed and expected counts do not closely agree and therefore the 
hypothesis of independence is false, and we can conclude that the type of any attack carried out 
does depend on the organization behind it. What this implies is that militant organizations 
specialize in a certain method of attack. 
 We can also use a Two-by-Two table to get inference about whether we can connect 
religious militant groups to suicide attacks and secular groups to attacks by means other than 
suicide (Table 4). Using the same test statistics yields X2 = 63.13 (p<0.0001) which is 
significant, indicating a correlation between the religious organizations and suicide attacks. The 
data suggests that suicide attacks seem to be a preferred attack tactic by PIJ and Hamas 
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compared to al-Fateh group. Particularly, the PIJ ranks first among all militant organizations in 
terms of the frequency of using suicide bombers relative to other groups. About half of the PIJ 
attacks against Israeli civilians and military targets are suicide attacks. On the other hand, one 
out of every seven attacks by Fateh group was a suicide attack and one out of every three attacks 
by Hamas was a suicide attack. 
 
 Table 4: Two-by-Two Contingency Table 
 Suicide attack other attack 
Religious organizations 
(PIJ & Hammas) 
96 (61.5) 59 (93.4) 
Secular organizations 
(Fateh,PFLP,DFLP)                        
29 (63.4) 131 (96.5) 
Total 125 190 
 
 The statistical evidence suggests that Palestinian religious organizations are keener to use 
suicide attacks than secular groups.  What is not clear, however, is whether religious groups tend 
to use suicide attacks because they are religious, or because there are other elements that 
determine what method of attack the militants will choose.  So why the PIJ and Hamas seem to 
prefer attacking Israeli targets using suicide bombers?  And why al Fateh group seemingly has a 
preference towards carrying out shooting attacks? 
Some researchers are attributing this organizational behavior to religious doctrine that 
encourages martyrdom. However, such an argument does not explain the behavior and pattern of 
attack in its entirety. For instance, al- Fateh (a secular group) carried out more suicide attacks in 
2002 than Hamas and PIJ combined (20 versus 18) from January to September 2002. To fill in 
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this gap, I propose three hypotheses explaining the recent ascendancy of suicide attacks by all 
Palestinians groups. 
The first hypothesis is the economic rational for using suicide attacks. Like any 
businesses entity, the militant groups will use the most efficient attack method. Efficiency in an 
attack, in this context, is defined as causing the largest number of casualties with the least 
resources. Certainly then, suicide bombings are very efficient attack tactic relative to other 
methods of attacks. The cost of preparing a suicide mission is relatively inexpensive, even at 
times cheaper than procuring a weapon from arms dealers in Gaza, yet more lethal. For example, 
Atran (2003) reports that the total cost of carrying out suicide attacks is about $150, and the most 
expensive item is the transportation of the suicide bomber. The components of a suicide bombing 
mission, the person and the material, are readily available. The cost of human labor to the 
militant organization is zero since all suicide bombers are volunteers. Suicide attacks can reflect 
the mode of desperation, bitterness, and hopelessness that is spread among young Palestinians. 
The premise that militant groups use suicide attacks because these are cost effective means that 
the elimination of suicide attacks requires both restricting the access to physical material, a 
costly and perhaps impossible to implement, and to subdue the incentive for individuals to agree 
to a suicide mission. Economic opportunities, humiliation, and the motive for retaliation and 
revenge which are a strong component of the Arab political culture are all important factors. 
Therefore, not only the PNA should be responsible for stopping suicide bombers, also Israel has 
a no small role to play in improving the treatment and living conditions of the Palestinians. 
 A second hypothesis for the rise in suicide attacks is the level of competition amongst 
different Palestinian groups. If studied within the context of an oligopolistic strategic behavior, 
then suicide attacks are perhaps the best response function for the various Palestinian militant 
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organizations. Since Hamas and PIJ were gaining support in the street, al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 
increased the number of suicide bombings as a strategic behavior to guarantee its survival. 
Militant groups are simply adopting their strategies to the competitive pressure to maintain or 
win more support in the Palestinian streets. Palestinian public opinion polls by Jerusalem Media 
& Communication Center of Palestinian opinion (December 1996 – April 2003) concerning 
suicide attacks, (favorable or strongly favorable) showed that support for suicide attacks has been 
in steady rise (S. Atran, personal communication, October 2003). For instance, in May 1997, 
about 24 percent of the Palestinian public supported suicide attacks. This figure reached 66 
percent at the beginning of the intifada and remains high to this day. Since a wide majority of 
Palestinians support suicide attacks it is hence conceivable that the leaders of the militant groups 
are aware of the popularity of suicide attacks, hence, they increase such attacks to enhance their 
popularity. In this respect, suicide attacks serve as a recruitment strategy and a way to boost the 
morals of its cadres and give them more political influence in the Palestinian streets. 
 Another plausible scenario is the potential link between the size of the militant 
organization and the tactic adopted. PIJ, the smallest militant organization in terms of its 
followers has the most extensive use of suicide bombings. On the other hand, the al Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades ranks third after Hamas in sending out suicide bombers. As the size of the 
organization decreases, so does the resources available to it. A small militant organization will 
want to economize on its resources thus ending up adopting the lethal yet relatively inexpensive 
attacks—suicide mission. Al-Fateh movement is thus responsible for about 50% all shooting 
attack while Hams and PIJ claimed responsibility for 70% of the suicide attacks.  
Although Palestinian religious insurrectionist groups are using suicide attacks, it is not a 
proof that religion is the sole driving force for such a behavior. It is possible that religious groups 
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are responding to a set of challenges and constraints (economic and social) that can be steering 
them into this direction. More research in needed in this subject. 
V.  A Poisson Model for the Attack Data  
In this section I examine the significance of the Palestinian unemployment rate and real 
GDP per capita in determining the number of attacks after controlling for the number of 
Palestinians killed. The number of Palestinians killed is a measure of conflict intensity which 
KM (2002) and B (2003) did not account for in their econometric analysis. Palestinian militant 
organizations almost always cite retaliation against Israeli attacks when issuing a statement 
claiming their attacks. Therefore the validity of studies by KM and B which did not control for 
noneconomic motivations for attack is questionable. 
Let Y be a random variable indicating the number that a particular method of attack 
(suicide, shooting, all attacks) occurred during a given year from 1990 to 2002. Following 
Cameron and Trivide (1998), I estimate a Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood model to account 
for heterogeneity in the data. Two separate specifications are considered: 
 
1 2
1 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
Specification 1 : ( )
Specification 2:  ( )
t
t
pkill t income t
pkill t unemp t
E y e
E y eα β β
α β β
+ +
+ +=
=  
 
where unemp(t), income(t), and Pkill(t) are the unemployment rate, real income per capita , and 
the logarithm of the number of Palestinians killed at time t, respectively. The dependent variable 
y(t) is measured in three different ways: Suicide attacks, shooting attacks, and total number of 
attacks. Therefore each specification was estimated three times for each type of attack method. 
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Table 5 shows the results for the maximum likelihood estimation using the two equations.  
Detailed results can be obtained from the author. 
 
Table 5: Results of the Count Data Regressions; Dependent Variables of Suicide Attacks,  
Shooting Attacks, and All Attacks 
                                                      Suicide Attacks                    Shooting Attacks                  All Attacks 
 
 
Palestinians Killed Annually 
from 1990-2002 
 
Not Significant  
 
Positive at 1% 
 
 
Positive at 1%  
 
Income percapita Negative at 5%  
 
Negative 1%  
 
Negative 1%  
 
Unemployment Not Significant  
 
Positive at 1%  
 
Positive at 1% 
 
 
  
According to the estimated models, the level of political violence as measured by the 
number of Palestinians killed by IDF is an important determinant for the level of total attacks in 
Israel. Also, unlike the finding of KM and B, economic factors become significant after 
accounting for conflict intensity as measured by the number of Palestinians killed. The results 
show that shooting but not suicide attacks appear to be more responsive to the number of 
Palestinians killed. Actually, this result confirms the existing patterns in attacks. In general, 
suicide attacks are a response to Israel military actions that resulted in the killing of Palestinian 
political leaders. But shooting attacks, which don’t require the involved planning similar to the 
one required by suicide attacks, are initiated after Israeli military incursions into Palestinian 
cities and villages. Therefore, the model predicts a rise in the number of shooting attacks against 
Israelis after Israeli military operations or incursions in the WBGS that result in the killing of 
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Palestinians. Unlike shooting attacks, suicide bombings are in general a response of Israel’s 
assassinations policy of Palestinian high-level cadres. This finding casts doubt on the Israeli 
government claim that its military incursions into the WBGS are meant to curb suicide 
bombings. Also, targeting leaders of militant organizations will only delay an attack but not halt 
attacks. Leaders of militant groups don’t have the know-how of carrying out suicide attacks. 
 As for the economic determinants of political violence in the WBGS, they are highly 
significant and their statistical sign conform to the prediction of deprivation theory. Precisely, an 
increase in the Palestinian income per capita will reduce Palestinian attacks against Israelis. Like 
wise, the model predicts that a reduction in the unemployment rate would reduce the incentive 
for young Palestinians to participate in political violence. 
 The above results reveal an important distinction between attacks that can be reduces by 
improving economic and political conditions in the Palestinian Territories (shooting attacks) and 
attacks that depend strictly on socio-political factors (suicide attacks). Therefore, an 
improvement in economic conditions will reduce the level of resistance to Israel’s. At the same 
time, halting the Israeli policy of assassination targeting Palestinian high-level cadres which 
triggers suicide attacks will stop such attacks.   
 
VI.  The Role of Grievances in Suicide Attacks: The ignored link 
There are few things we know about Palestinian suicide attackers that most scholars 
would agree on. First, they are in their twenties, with the average age of 22 years. Second, a 
considerable number of them had more than 12 years of education, which indicates that they 
were recruited from university campuses (Saleh, 2003). With regard to their economic status, the 
information remains speculative with no conclusive evidence depending on which variable is 
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used to measure the level of poverty. Researchers, however, are only focusing on the economic 
status or educational achievements as the prime factor contributing to suicide attacks. But could 
there be other salient factors stimulating suicide attacks against Israelis besides poverty and 
literacy which are ignored by researchers?  
One such relevant factor is the extent to which Israel Defense Force (IDF) military 
operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) is creating an environment conducive to 
encouraging suicide attacks. By this environment, I mean grievances that are only extinguished 
by revenge. Such IDF actions include: home demolitions, detention of suspected Palestinians 
without charge for prolonged periods of time (at least six months extended to one year), and 
collective punishment of Palestinians such as the detention of the brothers and father of a wanted 
Palestinian who is on the run. 
The Israeli Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Moshe Yaalon recognized the influence of 
grievances when he criticized Israeli government’s closure policy saying that such a policy is 
increase the support for militants. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3228843.stm). 
Two weeks later, four former Israeli security chiefs of the Shin Bet Security Agency, the agency 
responsible for protecting Israelis from attacks, sharply criticized Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s 
military incursions and policy indicating that such a policy will backfire and does not buy 
security for the Israelis (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3270491.stm). Yet, KM 
(2002) and B (2003) did not acknowledge in their study any role for anger, bitterness, and 
alienation that result from Israeli harsh policy of collective punishment.  Highest ranking military 
Israeli officials have already recognized that grievances can be a major force harnessed by 
militant groups looking for Palestinians to carry out attacks.  However, this is an omitted variable 
in the KM and B studies. 
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  Researchers on suicide militancy have been neglecting the grievance factor. As a result, 
terrorism experts, narrowed their focus on what seemed, on the surface, to be relevant factors 
(age, marital status, educational level, and poverty). Some times they simply attempted to extend 
what we already know from research on crime to research on suicide attacks (Fallacy of 
Composition).  
 But evidence on Palestinian suicide bombers is growing.  I have collected data on 
Palestinian suicide attackers from the official websites of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(PIJ).  By reading through the published biographies of Palestinian militants, I compiled a 
database on 87 suicide attackers who carried out suicide bombings or suicide shooting attacks 
inside Israel or in inside an Israeli settlement mostly during the second intifada.  
Table A-1 in the appendix lists the date and information on 44 suicide attacks that were 
carried out by Palestinians who had been exposed at some point in the past to IDF military 
measures—grievances that are listed in the second column of the table. 11 of the 44 suicide 
attackers with grievances had a relative (father, brother, or cousin) killed by IDF in the past. 
Almost all of the 44 were arrested or had one of their brothers arrested by IDF. Jessica Stern 
(2003) asked the recently assassinated Hamas spokesman Abu Shanab if there are any 
psychological differences between those who join the military wing and those who do not.  He 
replied “they are more religious than typical. Often they are angry-they may have seen someone 
being hurt. It’s also a question of the general atmosphere they live in”.  Hamas is aware of the 
power of personal grievances that some Palestinians have and has successfully used these 
grievances as a source of recruits for suicide attack. 
 Simply, recent research on Palestinian suicide militants has failed to consider the full 
range of stressors leading to suicide attacks. Restricting attention to only economic factors or 
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level of education has resulted, for example, in no understanding of why young Palestinians 
carry out suicide attacks. As a result, the Israeli government decided on more inhumane 
treatment of Palestinians through very heavy handed military incursions. The existing research is 
responsible for providing moral support to militarily aggressive policies against the general 
population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
 Academic research is always the basis of informed government policy. Unfortunately, 
research on Palestinian suicide bombers is conducted in away to justify not inform and guide 
Israeli and U.S. approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Innocent Palestinians and Israelis are 
dying everyday because there is a fundamental problem in existing Israeli right-wing policy that 
uses force to force Palestinians to stop their attacks. However, evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that force will only force more attacks.  
 Recently, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the two suicide bombers that struck 
Israel on September 9th, 2003 had been jailed by Israel and were released from jail earlier this 
year. Palestinians released from jail are never offered any type of psychological habilitation to 
adjust to life outside the jail. Many lose educational opportunities as well as jobs. Therefore, 
Palestinians released from Israeli detentions find comfort in joining back the militant groups. 
These groups work as a support group for militants with shared experiences.  For example, the 
young woman who carried out the suicide attack at Maxim restaurant in Haifa had lost her 
brother and fiancé after the IDF killed both of them in one of its military incursions in March 
2003. 
  
VII.  Conclusions 
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The typology of existing studies on suicide attacks has narrowly limited their search to 
only economic and educational backgrounds of the attackers—other relevant variable have been 
ignored and are lacking even though they might be dominant and salient.  
Studying the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by focusing only on economic factors will lead to 
counterintuitive conclusions.  Since 1990 to the present, economic conditions in the WBGS have 
been shaped largely by Israeli closure policy. Although economic causes are not a prime cause 
for political violence in the WBGS, they are still strong facilitators that feed the conflict. When 
considering the number of Palestinians killed in the empirical model, I conclude that the 
economic factors have become statistically significant. The statistical results indicate a strong 
direct relationship between the level of violence and the average unemployment rate in the 
Palestinian Territories, and an indirect relationship between the income per capita and 
Palestinian attacks. However, we should be cautious when interpreting the results. The statistical 
link is not monotonic; improving living conditions and increasing income-generating 
opportunities for young Palestinians will not lead to elimination of attacks against Israelis—it 
will only reduce it. My analysis of suicide bombers profile has also shown that there are personal 
grievances contributing to the rise in attacks.  
Including the number of Palestinians killed as a measure of conflict intensity produced 
estimation results that prove the ineffectiveness of the current Israeli government policies in 
preventing attacks.  The results show that shooting attacks against Israelis will rise with the 
number of Palestinians killed.  This result is consistent with the views voiced by the Israeli Chief 
of Staff, retired former directors of the Shen Bet, and the soldiers in the “Courage to Refuse” 
campaign.  
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In conclusion, the most serious effect of the current conflict is not on the economic loses, 
but in the great divide the intifada created between the two people. Unfortunately, the lasting 
impact of the intifada is making violence an acceptable way to settle disputes. Nafziger (2002) 
explains that “A tradition of deadly political violence makes societies more susceptible to its 
return. Past violence…is likely to lower the threshold for using violence to express dissent, 
making intensive forms of political conflict normatively justifiable,”(p.3).  Regardless of the root 
causes of this conflict, the current Israeli-Palestinian fighting moved the two peoples further 
away from peace than ever before.   
Endnote: I am grateful for the helpful comments I received from Wayne Nafziger, Scott Atran 
and Shelly Regenbaum. 
Appendix Table A-1 
Family or Self exposure to IDF actions: Forty-Four suicide attacks with recorded explicit 
grievances resulting from Israel Defense Force (IDF) military operations in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip 
Date of attack Grievances as mentioned in their bios as posted in 
the official website for Hamas, PIJ, and al-Aqsa 
Brigades. 
Hamas Suicide Attack date  
11/7/2002 (SSA) His cousin killed in a gun fight with IDF. 
5/13/2002 (SSA) Arrested in 1995 for one year. 
1/1/2001 (SBA) Arrested twice before. 
5/25/2001 (SBA) IDF killed his older brother in the First Intifada. 
11/7/2000 (SBA) with a boat (i) Arrested once before. 
(ii) Lost three fingers in the first intifada after the 
IDF shot him in the hand. 
(iii) IDF shot and injured three of his brothers and 
had two arrested. 
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4/6/1994 (SBA) Arrested in the First Intifada and lost part of his eye 
sight and developed arthritis while in Israel prison. 
10/10/2002 (SBA) Arrested in the First Intifada. 
3/31/2002 (SBA) (i) His cousin was assassinated with a car bomb by 
Israeli Mosad.  
(ii) His older brother arrested by IDF.  
(iii) He was arrested in 1997 by IDF. 
10/19/1994 (SBA) (i) IDF killed his brother in 1988. 
(ii) He was arrested by IDF. 
3/27/2001 (SBA) Injured by IDF gun fire before. 
6/4/1994 (SBA) Injured by IDF gun fire in the First Intifada. 
11/8/2001 (SBA) Arrested for the first time when he was still in high 
school and the second time when he was in college. 
5/18/2001 (SBA) His father died when he was young and he had to 
quit school at age 16 to help earn income for the 
family. 
7/9/2001 (SBA) (i) IDF injured him during the First Intifada in the 
eye. 
(ii) IDF killed one of his brothers  in 1987. 
(iii) IDF shot and fully paralyzed his other brothers.  
4/23/2002 (SSA) Left a farewell note to his family informing them of 
his intention to carry out an attack in revenge for the 
actions of the IDF in Jenin Camp during the 
incursion. 
PIJ Suicide Attack date  
5/1/1997 IDF arrested him several times. 
12/13/1993 (First Suicide Bomber) (i) He was arrested twice and spent 2 ½ years in 
Israeli jail. 
(ii) He was orphaned at the age of 10. 
11/22/1995 Was arrested three times in 1989 and 1994. 
11/4/2001 He was arrested twice and injured by IDF twice. 
5/24/2001 The IDF has beaten to death his brother during the 
First Intifada. 
5/12/1993 (i) IDF arrested his brother in 1986 . 
(ii) The IDF broke his arm after arresting him. 
3/4/1996 (SBA) IDF arrested him twice and injured him 3 times. 
11/5/1995 (SBA) (i) Injured by IDF gun fire in the First Intifada. 
(ii) IDF arrested him twice. 
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(iii) PA arrested him three times. 
11/6/1998 (SBA) (i) IDF killed his brother in the First Intifada. 
(ii) IDF arrested him three times before. 
10/9/1998 (SSA) (i) IDF shot and killed his father after his father 
attempted to stab a soldier. 
(ii) IDF shot his young brother 7 times in his body. 
(iii) IDF shot his sister in the head. She suffers form 
full paralysis. 
1/22/1995 (SBA) (i) IDF injured him 7 times in the First Intifada. 
(ii) IDF arrested his two brothers one for 3 years and 
the other for 1 ½ years. 
4/7/1993 (SSA) He was injured several times during the first intifada. 
11/2/1995 (SBA) He was arrested at the age of 15 when still in school. 
His farewell letter states that his attack was in 
revenge for the assassination of the leader of Islamic 
Jihad Dr. Al Shiqaqi. 
3/22/2002 (SSA) Few days before his attack and IDF tank fired at a 
house in his refugee camp killing the entire family 
except for a little child. 
4/19/2000 (SSA) IDF killed two of his uncles (not specified when this 
happened). 
12/28/2001 (SSA) IDF killed his brother. 
11/27/2001 (SSA) He was injured by IDF gun fire before. 
11/22/1993 (SBA) (i) IDF shot him in the leg in the First Intifada. 
(ii) IDF arrested him for 1 ½ years before. 
10/5/1993 (SSA) (i) His three brothers were in Israeli prison when he 
carried out his attack. 
(ii) He was arrested in the first intifada when he was 
very young. 
10/28/2002 (SSA) IDF arrested him in the first Intifada for 1 ½ years. 
11/11/1994 (SBA) (i) IDF killed his best friend few days before he 
carried out the attack. 
(ii) He was arrested before 
11/6/1998 (SBA)  IDF arrested him twice, the first time when he was 
only 15 years old. The second time when he was 17 
years old. He spent a total of 4 years in Israeli Jail. 
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10/22/2001 (SSA) (i) IDF arrested him twice in the First Intifada. 
(ii) IDF shot him twice in the First Intifada. The 
doctors could not remove one of the bullets form his 
body. 
Al Aqsa Brigades Attack data 
 
 
5/27/2002 (i) IDF assassinated his cousin who was a leader of 
Islamic Jihad in Nablus and demolished his house. 
(ii) The father of the suicide bomber said that his 
children became unemployed after the intifada death 
is better than living their lives the way it is. 
2/27/02 (2nd female SB) (i) Her cousin carried out a suicide attack in Tel Aviv 
almost a month before her 
(ii) Her mother and sister indicate that when Israelis 
shot and killed two pregnant women next to her 
home trying to cross the check point, she decided to 
avenge their killing.   
11/27/2001 (SSA) (i) Arrested in the First Intifada. 
(ii) IDF shot his brother in the stomach. 
4/12/2002 (female  SBA) (i) Her father ill and can’t work. 
(ii) her sister had a chronic disease. 
(iii) left school at the 7th grade to work to support the 
family. 
10/4/2001 SSA His two brothers were arrested before and one of 
them spent 4 years in jail. 
Notes: 
SSA=Suicide Shooting Attacks.  
SBA=Suicide Bombing Attacks.  
FI=First Intifada. 
 
Endnotes 
[1] B’TSELEM (2003, December). The IDF uses a variety of means to obstruct Palestinian 
movement: Physical obstacles that block roads.  Summary reports available at                               
http://www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Siege/Statistics.asp. Full report can be 
downloaded from Humanitarian Information Centre in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(OCHA) http://www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/docs/UN/OCHA/WBN33.pdf 
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